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Promotion of the Concept
of the Rule of Law Through
Implementation of the Central
America Free Trade Agreement
By Phillip A. Buhler, Esq., Moseley, Prichard, Parrish, Knight & Jones

I. Prologue – The Rule of Law
and the Liberal Tradition

The concept of “The Rule of Law” is the
foundation for stable, impartial and tenured
systems of jurisprudence in developed and
developing modern industrial democracies.
It is a concept which allowed the advance of
administrative and judicial systems from the
absolute rule of individuals and elite groups
to governments based upon the will of the
broad population. Indeed, this principle has
allowed the development of advanced legal

systems which in turn have permitted the
introduction of complex transnational commercial relationships and the rapid integration of global commerce and society.
William Pitt acknowledged that “where
law ends tyranny begins.” Friedrich Hayek,
decrying the decline of the rule of law in
the mid-Twentieth Century, wrote that “the
Rule of Law means that people do not have
to answer to the arbitrary decisions of governmental officials, instead they guide their
actions by what is prohibited by a clearly
See Rule of Law,” page 21
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defined law.” Very recently, a Chinese
lawyer who has challenged the lack
of a fair and impartial legal system
in his own country, and has been
persecuted for this challenge, wrote
his summary of the principle:
“The opposite of rule of law is rule
of person. In contrast, a key aspect
of rule of law is ‘limitation’. Rule of
law puts limits on the discretionary
power of government… The rule of
law ensures that individuals have
a secure area of autonomy and have
settled expectations by having their
rights and duties pre-established
and enforced by law.”

Quoting the Eighteenth Century
philosopher Charles de Secondat
Montesquieu, “We are free because
we live under civil laws.” 1
In the summer of 2006 lawyers
and businessmen in the Dominican
Republic, the United States and most
of Central America experienced full
implementation of the Dominican Republic – Central America Free Trade
Agreement (hereinafter CAFTA).
This regional trade agreement, following on the general model of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the parameters
of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), is intended to establish a comprehensive legal regime
to reduce and eventually eliminate
most national barriers to the trade
of goods and services between the
United States and the countries of
Central America and the Dominican
Republic.
There is a substantial history in
much of Central America of efforts to
create free and open markets and promulgate a stable legal regimen to encourage development through foreign
commerce. The nations of Central
America, initially established as the
United Provinces of Central America,
obtained independence from Spain
scarcely a generation after the United
States, and were governed in the
formative years (the 1820s) by a classic liberal regime. The government
sought to break with the statist and
mercantilist Spanish imperial system
by opening the region to foreign commerce and reducing or eliminating

the influence of the landed holdings
of the Church and Iberian/Creole aristocracy. The Liberal policies of this
government included elimination of
many barriers to foreign investment
and trade, promotion of capitalist
enterprises and settlement of foreign
nationals (principally British and later German and North American).2
Unfortunately, these policies did
not lead to uniformly positive results.
The influx of foreign investment and
commerce into the nascent United
Provinces caused economic and social
dislocations in certain areas and led
to resentment of outside influence
and a certain insularity that endures.
The struggle between rival interests
and their reaction to the opening of
Central America to free trade also led
to a series of civil wars and polarization between Liberal and Conservative parties that existed well into
the Twentieth Century. The failure
of Central America’s first liberal regime was reflected most starkly in
the break-up of the nascent Central
American republic by 1840 into the
respective states which exist today.
Not only did this reaction create difficulties for foreign trade and relations,
but also established internal barriers
within the former United Provinces
which in part still exist.

II. The CAFTA –
A Summary and Overview3

ment governing tariff and regulatory
matters for the trade of goods and
services between the United States,
on the one hand, and Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic
on the other. As set forth more fully
in Section III below, CAFTA follows
a succession of free trade agreements
between the United States and other
countries in Latin America and other
parts of the world.
On October 1, 2002, President
George Bush notified Congress of
the Administration’s intention to enter into negotiations for a free trade
agreement with the five Central
American countries. Those negotiations took place between January and
December 2003. Negotiations were
completed with all of these countries
except Costa Rica, which withdrew
and later renewed negotiations which
were ultimately completed in January
2004. Separate negotiations between
the United States and the Dominican
Republic also began in January 2004
and with the decision to incorporate
the Dominican Republic into CAFTA,
those negotiations were completed
by March 15, 2004. CAFTA was ultimately signed by all seven party
nations on August 4, 2004.4
Ratification of CAFTA by the signatory countries has been a longer,
and in some cases, much more difficult process. In the United States,

CAFTA is a broad free trade agree-

continued, next page
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after a contentious debate in Congress and nationally, the U.S. Senate passed implementing legislation
on June 30, 2005 with the House of
Representatives following with a very
close vote on July 28, 2005. President
Bush signed the legislation into law
on August 2, 2005.5
In Central America, several party
nations saw their national legislatures ratify CAFTA by large margins,
and relatively soon after formal signing in 2004. The Salvadoran legislature was the first to ratify CAFTA
on December 17, 2004, followed by
the Honduran legislative ratification
on March 3, 2005 and Guatemalan
ratification on March 10, 2005. The
Dominican Republic ratified CAFTA
on September 6, 2005 with an almost
unanimous vote in the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate.6
Ratification has been most difficult in Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
The Nicaraguan ratification process
involved strident opposition in some
quarters, and CAFTA was finally
ratified by a narrower margin on
October 9, 2005.7 The ratification process in Costa Rica has been held up
based upon objections by unions and
others to several aspects of CAFTA,
including in particular opening up of
trade in insurance and telecommunications services and the possibility of privatization of certain State
industries.8 President Oscar Arias,
who favors CAFTA, won election in
2006 by a narrow margin on his support for the agreement and in July
2007 he prevailed in the Costa Rican
court system in his effort to hold a
national referendum on CAFTA. That
referendum is scheduled to be held on
October 7.9
CAFTA contains a provision, at
Chapter 22, Article 22.5, that the
Agreement shall enter into force on
January 1, 2005 provided that the
United States and one or more other
signatories notify the depository that
they have completed their applicable
legal procedures, but if the Agreement
did not enter into force on January 1,
2005, the Agreement shall enter into
force after the United States and one
or more other signatories make such
a notification, on such later date as

they may agree. Due to both ratification and implementation issues, the
2005 date was not met. Respective
official government websites indicate
that CAFTA entered into force in El
Salvador on March 1, 2006 and in
Honduras and Nicaragua on April
1, 2006. After several delays CAFTA
went into force in Guatemala on July
1, 2006 and in the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007. The CAFTA
provisions now apply in the United
States as to the countries which have
implemented the Treaty.10
It should also be noted that CAFTA
does not change the customs and
trade relationships between the nations party to the Treaty in Central
America and the Dominican Republic. Trade between these countries is
governed by existing bilateral agreements which to a great extent have
reduced or eliminated many of the
prior trade barriers.11 One of the arguments in the Costa Rican debate
is that CAFTA will encourage the
Central American countries to come
together themselves. Some progress
is being made between Honduras,
Guatemala and El Salvador on this
score, but on the other hand opposition to CAFTA in some quarters has
stalled negotiations with the European Union on a similar agreement.12

III. Precursors and
Successors

The reduction of tariffs and other
trade barriers and the effort to open
up free trade in Central America
substantially predates the beginning of the CAFTA negotiations. In
fact, the opponents of CAFTA usually fail to acknowledge that all of
the signatories to the Convention
have enjoyed substantially the same
privileges vis à vis their trade with
the United States for over twenty
years. In many respects, CAFTA only
serves to equalize these trade advantages by reducing or eliminating most
of the barriers to U.S. products and
businesses entering Central America
and the Dominican Republic as those
countries’ products and businesses
have enjoyed moving in the other
direction.
In the early 1980s, the United
States recognized the necessity of encouraging economic advancement in
the Caribbean Basin, encompassing
not only the Caribbean island nations
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but also countries on the Caribbean
littoral, including Central America.
This was due in no small part to a
number of political disruptions and
the threat of the spread of communism, notable with the Nicaraguan
Revolution in 1979, civil wars and
unrest in El Salvador, Honduras and
Guatemala and the expansion of the
regional narcotics drug trade, with
the connivance of a number of corrupt governments, from the northern
coast of South America to the United
States.
The administration of President
Ronald Reagan established the Caribbean Basin Initiative as an effort
to rejuvenate the Caribbean Basin
economies and therefore reduce the
incentive for radical political changes
and criminal activity. The core aspect
of the Caribbean Basin Initiative
was the enactment of the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983
(CBERA).13 Under the CBERA the
President was authorized to grant
duty-free treatment to all eligible articles originating from any beneficiary
country in accordance with provisions
of the Act. “Beneficiary countries” are
listed in the Act, including each of the
current signatories to CAFTA. The
President could designate a country as a beneficiary to the CBERA
if it met certain conditions, and was
prohibited from designating a country as a beneficiary under certain
conditions, most notably if it was a
communist country; had nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized
property owned by a U.S. citizen; or
had repudiated or nullified existing
contracts or violated patent or trademark conventions.14 Section 2703 of
the CBERA identifies commodities
produced in the beneficiary countries
which would be eligible for duty free
treatment.
In 1990 the United States enacted
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990 (Expansion Act)15 with the goal to both
reaffirm the CBERA and to amend it
to improve its operation. The Expansion Act addresses certain types of
products in greater detail, increases
duty-free allotments, more fully addresses rules of origin for the components of products and even contains
amendments to the section dealing
with worker rights.
In 1994 the elected leaders of
thirty-four countries in North and

South America met at the Summit of
the Americas. They agreed to work
towards the negotiation and conclusion of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas by the year 2005. In working towards that goal, a number of
countries entered into negotiations
with the United States to establish
localized free trade agreements, the
ultimate goal to combine them into
a free trade area encompassing the
entire Western Hemisphere.
On January 1, 1994, the North
American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) entered into force between
the United States, Canada and Mexico.16 One of the effects of NAFTA was
that it eliminated the advantages
enjoyed by the beneficiary countries
of the CBERA and related provisions
of the Caribbean Basin Initiative
against Mexico in relative trade with
the United States. At the same time,
NAFTA became a model for the expansion of free trade regimes in Latin
America.
Political stability seemed to return to Central America with the
conclusion of civil wars and success
of democratic elections in Nicaragua
and El Salvador and efforts to control
the narcotics trade in the Caribbean.
At the same time, natural disasters
in the form of several catastrophic
hurricanes struck the Caribbean and
Central America in the late 1990s,
leading to severe economic disruption.17 As a result of these trends
through the 1990s, in 2000 the United
States enacted the United States
– Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) 18 as part of the
Trade and Development Act of 2000.19
The main purpose of this Act was to
provide the twenty-four beneficiary
countries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative enhanced trade preferences to
equalize their U.S. trading privileges
with those of Mexico under NAFTA
and to encourage negotiations towards the Free Trade Area of the
Americas. A key effect of the CBTPA
was to significantly expand preferential treatment for apparel made
in the Caribbean Basin region. The
CBTPA would also give NAFTA-like
parity on a temporary basis, pending expansion of the FTAA negotiations.20 The enactment of CAFTA now
supersedes these various Caribbean
Basin treaties with respect to the
beneficiary countries.
Shortly after the CBTPA was en-

acted negotiations began in 2003 for
CAFTA. At the same time, the United States and Chile entered into a
free trade agreement21 and by early
2007 the United States was negotiating or had signed bilateral trade
agreements with Panama, Colombia,
Peru and Bolivia.22 Prospects for the
Colombian agreement appear dimmest due to opposition in the Democratic-controlled Senate based upon
issues with Colombia’s anti-guerilla
campaign and alleged human rights
abuses, and other political issues may
yet derail negotiations with Bolivia
and Peru. While the nations of the
Americas were unable to reach their
goal of creating a Free Trade Area
of the Americas by 2005, the extent
of smaller regional free trade agreements, and the potential merger of
these agreements (as was done with
the Central America and Dominican
Republic negotiations) gives promise
that the free trade concept can be expanded through much of the region.

IV. The CAFTA as an
Engine to Promote the Rule
of Law

In many respects CAFTA serves
as a vehicle for promoting honest
and stable government. An increase
in legitimate trade, critical for economic development and growth in
all of the party states, can only be accomplished where the legal environment gives reassurance of security
and protection to those involved in
trade and investment. There are five
areas addressed by CAFTA which are
critical to the promotion of a stable
economic environment grounded in
the Rule of Law.
A. Transparency and AntiCorruption
The Preamble to CAFTA sets forth
that the member states “seek to facilitate regional trade by promoting efficient and transparent customs procedures that reduce costs and ensure
predictability for their importers and
exporters.” The parties also resolve to
“promote transparency and eliminate
bribery and corruption in international trade and investment.”
Chapter V provides technical and
practical applications for this goal.
Article 5.2 mandates simplified procedures to timely release goods, thereby
reducing the opportunity for extortion
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and corruption in the import process.
Article 5.5 requires the parties to cooperate in achieving compliance with
their respective laws, and in particular requires parties with reasonable
suspicion of unlawful activity related
to the laws and regulations governing
imports to coordinate with other parties and share information in efforts
to combat unlawful activity. Article
5.10 requires that a state party, upon
written request of an importer, must
provide an advanced written ruling
on the application of tariffs prior to
the importation into its territory of
goods from another party. This provision may have the effect of reducing
the opportunity for corrupt customs
officials to extort money from importers by holding arrived goods under
false pretenses.
Chapter VII, pertaining to the
elimination of technical barriers to
trade, may likewise serve indirectly
to reduce the opportunities for localized corruption by requiring parties
to adhere to international standards
and guidelines that reduce the opportunities for local officials to set their
own rules for improper purposes. This
is an ideal example of the application
of the Rule of Law, setting uniform
and widely recognized norms and
standards to eliminate opportunities for chaos or corruption. Article
7.7 deals entirely with the issue of
transparency. This article mandates
that each party shall allow citizens of
the other parties to participate in the
development of standards, technical
regulations and conformity assessment procedures. All such standards
are to be published and made available to the public. This requires complete openness in the promulgation
and enforcement of regulations and
should also make these regulations
reasonably uniform. This will give importers assurance of set laws. Hopefully such uniform regulations will
be approved by all party states with
their joint participation. Article 7.8
sets up a committee on technical barriers to monitor the implementation
and administration of this Chapter.
Chapter IX, pertaining to government procurement, sets out in Article 9.13 to “ensure integrity in procurement practices.” Referencing the
anti-corruption measures of Article
18.8, this article requires each party
continued, next page
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to adopt or maintain procedures to
declare ineligible suppliers that the
party has determined have engaged in
fraudulent or other illegal actions in
relation to government procurement.
Chapter XVIII is solely devoted to
the issues of transparency and corruption. Section A addresses transparency. In addition to requiring open
communication between the parties
and publication of each party’s laws,
regulations, procedures and administrative rulings, Article 18.4 establishes administrative proceedings
for persons of another party directly
affected by a party’s administrative
decisions. Section B pertains solely to
anti-corruption. Article 18.8 requires
each party to adopt or maintain necessary legislative or other measures to
establish as criminal offenses certain
matters affecting international trade
or investment, including bribery of
public officials, acceptance by public
officials of bribes or favors, directly
or indirectly, or aiding and abetting
such practices.
B. Investment and Property
Guarantees
The Preamble sets forth that the
parties seek to “create and expand a
secure market for the goods and services produced in their territories . ..”
and to “ensure a predictable commercial framework for business planning
and investment.” One of the principal
objectives set forth in Chapter I is
to provide adequate and effective
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each party’s
territory. The key chapter for this concept, however, is Chapter X - Investment. In addition to guaranteeing
equal treatment for investors of other
party states, Article 10.7 contains a
clear limitation on any governmental
expropriation or nationalization of a
covered investment, either directly or
indirectly. This article sets a general
prohibition, with exceptions made for
public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, and only upon prompt
payment of “adequate and effective
compensation” in accordance with
provisions contained in the article.
The article also specifies that such
compensation must be equivalent to

the fair market value of the expropriated investment, be paid without delay and be fully realizable and freely
transferable. Finally, Article 10.10
addresses a problem that has arisen
as disguised nationalization in the
past. This article mandates that no
party may require an enterprise to
appoint to senior management positions natural persons of any particular nationality. This prevents a state
from gaining control over a foreign
investment by requiring the company
to cede control of the management of
the investment to local persons with
connections to corrupt local officials.
Chapter XI likewise contains, at Article 11.9, another protection against
indirect nationalization by requiring
free transfer of payments out of the
territory of a party to prevent control
over the finances of an investment
and other currency restrictions that
inhibit free investment.
C. Coordination and Uniformity
in Domestic Laws and Equal
Treatment Under Same
A third pillar for the establishment of the Rule of Law are terms in
CAFTA to promulgate uniformity in
domestic laws of each party affecting
trade and to encourage coordination
between the parties to create uniformity in their domestic laws and
equal treatment of their traders and
investors.
In the Preamble the parties resolve
to “ensure a predictable commercial
framework for business planning and
investment,” particularly recognizing
“the interest of the Central American
parties in strengthening and deepening their regional economic integration.” Economic integration can only
be accomplished where there is uniformity of the legal regime governing
trade and commerce so as to allow the
free flow of goods and services.
The Preamble also states that the
parties are committed to building on
their respective rights and obligations under the Marrakesh Agreement established in the World Trade
Organization and other multi-lateral
and bi-lateral instruments of cooperation. Under Chapter III, Article 3.2
commits each party to accord national treatment to the goods of another
party in accordance with Article III
of the GATT 1994, and incorporates
Article III of the GATT 1994 into
CAFTA. The potential for discrimi-
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natory treatment in enforcement of
tariffs in each party is precluded by
Article 3.3 which eliminates, either
gradually or immediately, most national tariffs. Article 3.5(a) permits
free transit through the territory
of the party states of vehicles and
containers carrying products in international trade, and Article 3.11 prohibits the imposition of export taxes
on any goods. These articles under
Chapter III eliminate most domestic
tariff regimes and thereby create a
uniform open trading system, with
the same system applicable in each
party.
Chapter IV approaches the concept of uniformity and equalization
in a different light by mandating,
at Article 4.21, common guidelines
for the interpretation, application
and administration of provisions under Chapters III and IV, particularly
as they apply to rules of origin for
products to be provided with free or
favorable tariff treatment. Where
regulations and tariffs are not absolutely eliminated, they are subject to
mandates to create uniform common
regulations and guidelines for all parties to the Convention.
Similarly, under Chapter V dealing with customs administration and
trade facilitation, Article 5.5 again
mandates cooperation between the
parties. While under this article the
parties are not required to create uniform customs and trade regulations,
they are required to give advance notice to other parties of any significant
modifications in their administrative
policies or similar developments related to their laws and regulations
governing importations where those
are likely to substantially affect the
operation of the Convention. They are
often required to cooperate in achieving compliance with their respective national laws and regulations.
Due to the detailed requirements of
the latter clause, it will be necessary
for the parties to closely coordinate
and unify, as much as possible, their
respective domestic regulations in
order to adequately enforce those
of the other parties for the efficient
continuation of trade.
There are a number of articles in
various chapters of CAFTA mandating equal treatment by each party
of the citizens of other parties in all
aspects of trade and investment. For
instance, in Chapter X on investment,

Article 10.3 requires each party to
accord to investors of another party
treatment no less favorable than that
it accords to its own investors. In
Chapter XI concerning trade and
services, Article 11.9 requires the
parties to provide mutual recognition of all licenses and certifications,
including recognition of the education
or experience obtained by citizens
of another party on the same basis
as that recognized for the residents
of that party. In Chapter XII relating to financial services, Article 12.2
again mandates that each party shall
accord to investors of another party
treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to domestic investors in the
establishment of various types of
financial services.
D. Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms
One of the most important aspects
of establishing the Rule of Law for the
governance of any state or grouping
of states is the creation of adequate
and impartial dispute resolution
mechanisms. CAFTA contains extensive provisions for the inter-party
and private (individual) resolution of
disputes arising out of the free trade
regime that has been created.
Under Chapter I, Article 1.2(f) provides as a basic objective that the parties are to “create effective procedures
for the implementation and application of this agreement, for its joint
administration, and for the resolution of disputes.” Thereafter, Chapter
XX in its entirety governs “dispute
settlement.” Section A, Articles 20.1
through 20.19 contains extremely
detailed provisions and procedures
to follow for any disputes regarding
the interpretation or application of
CAFTA, where a party state considers
that an actual or proposed measure
of another party state is inconsistent
with CAFTA, where a party state
has failed to carry out its obligations
under CAFTA, or where the action of
another party state would cause nullification or impairment of CAFTA.
Section A of Chapter XX requires
consultation and mediation. Failing
this, there are detailed rules for the
implementation of an arbitration procedure and limited exceptions to the
requirement for arbitration.
Section B of Chapter XX pertains
to domestic proceedings and private
commercial dispute settlement. Ar-

ticles 20.20 through 20.22 provide
for referral of matters to judicial or
administrative proceedings and alternative dispute resolution.
Other chapters of CAFTA set
out dispute resolution mechanisms
pertaining to specific aspects of the
Convention. Chapter V (Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation)
provides for administrative and judicial review under Article 5.8. Chapter
X (Investment), at Section B, contains
the most detailed and specialized
investor-state dispute settlement
system. This provides detailed rules
mandating submission of a claim to
arbitration with certain conditions
and limitations. Importantly, Article
10.21 contains a detailed transparency requirement for the arbitral
proceedings.
Under Chapter XII governing financial services Articles 12.18 and
12.19 provide another dispute settlement mechanism governing this aspect of the new trade regime.
With the extensive dispute resolution mechanisms set up to govern
interpretation of CAFTA as a whole
and to govern private disputes arising under the CAFTA regime, as well
as incorporation of other international trade agreements, the state
parties and their citizens should find
adequate tools to enforce the terms
and conditions of the new regime.
This is perhaps the most important
aspect of CAFTA in promoting the
establishment of the Rule of Law over
this free trade area.
E. Labor and Environment
Two issues that garnered the largest amount of protest outside of business and government circles during
the course of the CAFTA negotiations
were labor and environment. These
grabbed the attention of populist
protesters and also appear to be the
subject of much of the anti-CAFTA
writings, both in the popular press
and in academic circles.23
While CAFTA is attacked for not
adequately protecting the interests
of labor or satisfactorily addressing
environmental concerns, it should be
noted that nothing in CAFTA reduces
protections in these categories, and
in fact the CAFTA regime as a whole
would tend to encourage promotion
of protective measures. Admittedly,
the general purpose of a free trade
agreement such as CAFTA is not
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directed to such protections, but with
proper mandates and oversight of
party states these goals can be addressed.
The Preamble specifies that the
parties are resolved to “protect, enhance, and enforce basic workers’
rights and strengthen their cooperation on labor matters…create
new employment opportunities and
improve working conditions and living standards in their respective
territories,” and therefore the state
parties will “build on their respective international commitments on
labor matters.” Also, the parties resolve to “implement this agreement
in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation,
promote sustainable development,
and strengthen their cooperation on
environmental matters,” and “protect and preserve the environment
and enhance the means for doing so,
including through the conservation
of natural resources in their respective territories.” Other sections of
the Preamble resolve to “create new
opportunities for economic and social
development in the region” and to
“safeguard the public welfare.”
While these protective goals are
the most extensively addressed terms
in the Preamble to CAFTA, CAFTA
also contains a full chapter devoted
to labor protection, and another full
chapter devoted to the environment.
Chapter XVI – Labor first requires,
at Article 16.2, that parties must enforce their existing labor laws. This
goes beyond what some writers have
deemed to be the inadequate labor
protections existing in the laws of
many of the Central American countries. Article 16.1 reaffirms the obligations of all members of CAFTA as
members of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and their commitments under the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work and its follow-up (ILO Declaration).24
Prior to the conclusion of the
CAFTA negotiations, surveys were
performed within the various party
states and it was determined generally that the party states have sufficient
labor laws on the books, although in
some cases there are problems with
enforcement or the ability to enforce
those laws.25 For this, Articles 16.5
continued, next page
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and 16.6 and Annex 16.5 provide for
cooperation among the parties and a
capacity-building mechanism whereby assistance can be obtained to help
with full enforcement of existing labor laws and to bring any deficiencies
up to standard. With the assistance
not only of the United States but of
the more prosperous Central American parties, those states which are
deemed to be unable to fully enforce
their existing labor laws or to implement enforcement systems acceptable to the ILO will now have the
opportunity to share in both technical
resources and obtain financial and
informational assistance.
Chapter XVII – Environment is
structured in a similar manner to the
labor chapter. It also sets goals and
mandates enforcement of existing
laws, and furthermore provides for
shared information and assistance
in developing adequate enforcement
mechanisms and collaborative assistance. The chapter references other
multi-lateral environmental agreements to which the state parties are
members and requires continued
efforts to enhance the mutual support of multi-lateral environmental
agreements within their jurisdiction.
While certain aspects of this chapter
are generalized or set in aspirational
terms, such as Annex 17.9 pertaining to environmental cooperation,
this will allow the parties with more
advanced environmental laws and
technical enforcement to readily assist others to improve their environmental regulations. The strong
interest shown by many non-governmental groups during the course
of the CAFTA negotiations would
also indicate that pressure from
these groups after the enactment of
CAFTA will encourage the parties to
continue to develop environmental
enforcement more thoroughly than
before they became parties to CAFTA.
Again, CAFTA has served to spread
the interest in regulation of labor and
environmental matters more directly
to countries which would not have
benefited from these concepts without joining CAFTA.

Conclusion

The approved text of CAFTA, including its Annexes, and the goals set
for implementation by the countries
which have ratified the Convention
provides a great opportunity to establish a relatively uniform legal
system governing commerce in Central America. This uniform system
will produce certainty to businesses
and investors in the region, promoting the growth of commerce and free
enterprise. The unification of most
aspects of the legal system governing
trade will also help, both directly and
indirectly, to reduce abuses caused by
the uncertain enforcement of varying laws and ad hoc enforcement of
regulations. In the global economy,
only this certainty will encourage the
development of trade.
There is legitimacy in the concerns
expressed by some about the effects of
opening smaller and less developed
economies to competition from large
industries and agriculture based in an
economic superpower.26 CAFTA takes
account of this in multiple special provisions and exceptions contained in
Annexes and reservations as to each
member country. The concerns are
also noted in the set of goals enumerated in the first chapter of the Convention. There is no question that some
amount of dislocation and economic
stress may result from the initial
implementation of the open market.
However, the benefits foreseen from
the application of a uniform and open
legal system for the benefit of trade
may extend much further than even
the supporters of CAFTA can now
anticipate. The free trade systems
which have benefited other nations
and regions, if handled properly and
monitored closely, may bring tremendous benefits to Central America and
the Caribbean first dreamed of by
statesmen in these countries some
two hundred years ago.
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taxes, undergo rigorous security and
background checks, and pay hefty
fines for entering the country illegally. This earned legalization is not
an “amnesty” program when the government penalizes immigrants with
hefty fines for their illegal entry.

technology-based security measures
such as lighting, sensors, and night
vision devices that would enhance the
capability of Border Patrol officers to
detect, locate and apprehend illegal
entrants.

Tougher and More
Effective Enforcement

Perhaps the United States is far
less divided on immigration than the
current debate suggests. According to
another recent Gallup Poll, generally
U.S. citizens have a positive view of
immigration in the abstract. “Three
in four have consistently said it has
been good for the United States in the
past, and a majority says it is good for
the nation today.”5 A comprehensive
immigration reform bill would channel this general sentiment into a bill
that increases employment-based
visas, creates tougher and more effective enforcement, and provides a road
to legalization for undocumented immigrants already in the country. In
order to successfully overhaul our
current immigration systems, these
three elements must be addressed
and implemented simultaneously.

Failure to pass the comprehensive
immigration reform bill means that
enforcement measures will not be
adequately funded until after the
presidential elections. In the meantime, the country continues to fear
terrorism and to desire a reduction in
illegal immigration. However, the solution to the illegal immigration problem is not to build a wall along the
southern border with Mexico. Illegal
immigration may be curtailed along
the northern and southern borders
by increasing the number of border
patrol and electronic surveillance.
Congress must appropriate the funds
to fully staff Border Patrol and border
security technology. Already Congress has committed to a variety of

Conclusion

27

The goal should be to replace the current illegal flow of immigration with a
lawful influx since it is arguably good
for the economy and necessary for our
national security.
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